The banality of law: some remarks on legal conventionalism

The paper is concerned with the Hartian idea that the justification of law’s normativity can be traced back to the exquisite social fact, viz. special kind of social convention. After discussing the view that the rule of
The paper is concerned with the Hartian idea that the justification of law’s normativity can be traced back to the exquisite social fact, viz. special kind of social convention. After discussing the view that the rule of recognition is a coordinative convention A. Marmor’s idea of constitutive convention is introduced. Relying on J. Dickson’s brilliant enquiry I finally argue that this latter idea is deprieved of any explanatory power, which was pressuposed by H.L.A. Hart when he himself reffered to the conventional rule of recognition as social fact having full normative significance.
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Metadaten
Author:Adam Dyrda
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-249325
Series (Serial Number):25th IVR World Congress: Law, Science and Technology Frankfurt am Main 15–20 August 2011 ; Paper Series (074)
Publisher:Goethe-Univ.
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Year of Completion:2012
Year of first Publication:2012
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2012/07/20
Tag:constitutive convention; conventionalism; coordination convention; rule of reconition
Pagenumber:13
Institutes:Rechtswissenschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:340 Recht
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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