Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany

The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the fir
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
show moreshow less

Download full text files

Export metadata

  • Export Bibtex
  • Export RIS

Additional Services

    Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Metadaten
Author:Theodor Baums, Kenneth E. Scott
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-8613
URL:http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_016.pdf
Parent Title (German):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institute for Law and Finance ; 16
Series (Serial Number):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institute for Law and Finance (16)
Publisher:Inst. for Law and Finance
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2003
Year of first Publication:2003
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2005/04/29
HeBIS PPN:135264545
Institutes:Rechtswissenschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:340 Recht
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

$Rev: 11761 $