Performance measurement and information production

When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devot
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
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Metadaten
Author:Christian Laux, Volker Laux
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7874
Parent Title (English):Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 133
Series (Serial Number):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (133)
Publisher:Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2004
Year of first Publication:2004
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2005/04/25
Tag:Anreizvertrag; Betriebliche Kennzahl; Informationsverhalten; Theorie
Agency Theory
SWD-Keyword:Leistungsbewertung; Leistungsmessung
Pagenumber:30
Source:Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting ; 133
HeBIS PPN:188880445
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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