An international relations perspective on the convergence of corporate governance : German shareholder capitalism and the European Union, 1999-2000

The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of econ
The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.
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Metadaten
Author:Jeffrey N. Gordon
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7407
Series (Serial Number):Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht (108)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2005/04/11
Year of first Publication:2002
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2005/04/11
Source:Institut für Bankrecht, Arbeitspapiere 108
HeBIS PPN:203438248
Institutes:Rechtswissenschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:340 Recht
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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