An international relations perspective on the convergence of corporate governance : German shareholder capitalism and the European Union, 1999-2000
The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.
| Author: | Jeffrey N. Gordon |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7407 |
| Series (Serial Number) | Arbeitspapiere // Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht (108) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 11.04.2005 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2002 |
| Publishing Institution: | Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main |
| Source: | Institut für Bankrecht, Arbeitspapiere 108 |
| HeBIS PPN: | 203438248 |
| Institutes: | Rechtswissenschaft |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 340 Recht |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen ohne Print on Demand |
