Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard
The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm’s objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting. JEL Classification: G22, D82
| Author: | Christian Laux |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339 |
| Series (Serial Number) | CFS working paper series (2008, 54) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 29.01.2009 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2008 |
| Publishing Institution: | Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main |
| Tag: | Deductible Insurance; Integrated Risk Management ; Multiline Insurance ; Umbrella Policies |
| HeBIS PPN: | 210308885 |
| Institutes: | Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen ohne Print on Demand |
