Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard

The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contrac
The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm’s objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.
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Metadaten
Author:Christian Laux
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339
Parent Title (German):CFS working paper series ; 2008, 54
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2008, 54)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2009/01/29
Year of first Publication:2008
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2009/01/29
Tag:Deductible Insurance; Integrated Risk Management ; Multiline Insurance ; Umbrella Policies
HeBIS PPN:210308885
Institutes:Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
JEL-Classification:D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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