Anreizwirkungen und Bewertung von Erfolgsbeteiligungen im Portefeuillemanagement

Performance fees for portfolio managers are designed to align the managers' goals with those of the investors and to motivate managers to aquire "superior" information and to make better investment decisions. A part of t
Performance fees for portfolio managers are designed to align the managers' goals with those of the investors and to motivate managers to aquire "superior" information and to make better investment decisions. A part of the literature analyzes performance fees on the basis of market valuation. In this article it is shown that market valuation faces a dilemma: on the one hand, the conditions which allow for market valuation imply that the portfolio manager perfectly hedges the performance fee. This in turn implies severe restrictions on the incentive effects of the performance fee. In particular, the fee does not motivate the manager to use superior information for investment decisions concerning the managed portfolio. On the other hand, better incentives can only be generated under conditions which exclude market valuation. In this case, the analysis has to be based on expected utility valuation. JEL-Classification: D 82, G 11, 12, 14 Keywords: performance fees, portfolio managers, "superior" information, market valuation, incentive effects
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Metadaten
Author:Robert M. Gillenkirch
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-70199
Series (Serial Number):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (007)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:German
Date of Publication (online):2009/09/15
Year of first Publication:1997
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2009/09/15
Tag:"superior" information ; incentive effects; market valuation ; performance fees ; portfolio managers
HeBIS PPN:218415699
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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