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The high return to private schooling in a low-income country (2011)

Tessa Bold Mwangi Kimenyi Germano Mwabu Justin Sandefur

Existing studies from the United States, Latin America, and Asia provide scant evidence that private schools dramatically improve academic performance relative to public schools. Using data from Kenya—a poor country with weak public institutions—we find a large effect of private schooling on test scores, equivalent to one full standard deviation. This finding is robust to endogenous sorting of more able pupils into private schools. The magnitude of the effect dwarfs the impact of any rigorously tested intervention to raise performance within public schools. Furthermore, nearly twothirds of private schools operate at lower cost than the median government school.

Why did abolishing fees not increase public school enrollment in Kenya? (2011)

Tessa Bold Mwangi Kimenyi, Germano Mwabu Justin Sandefur

A large empirical literature has shown that user fees signicantly deter public service utilization in developing #countries. While most of these results reflect partial equilibrium analysis, we find that the nationwide abolition of public school fees in Kenya in 2003 led to no increase in net public enrollment rates, but rather a dramatic shift toward private schooling. Results suggest this divergence between partial- and general-equilibrium effects is partially explained by social interactions: the entry of poorer pupils into free education contributed to the exit of their more affluent peers.

Scaling-up what works : experimental evidence on external validity in Kenyan education (2013)

Tessa Bold Mwangi Kimenyi Germano Mwabu Alice Ng'ang'a Justin Sandefur

The recent wave of randomized trials in development economics has provoked criticisms regarding external validity. We investigate two concerns—heterogeneity across beneficiaries and implementers—in a randomized trial of contract teachers in Kenyan schools. The intervention, previously shown to raise test scores in NGO- led trials in Western Kenya and parts of India, was replicated across all Kenyan provinces by an NGO and the government. Strong effects of shortterm contracts produced in controlled experimental settings are lost in weak public institutions: NGO implementation produces a positive effect on test scores across diverse contexts, while government implementation yields zero effect. The data suggests that the stark contrast in success between the government and NGO arm can be traced back to implementation constraints and political economy forces put in motion as the program went to scale.

Trust in the monetary authority (2013)

Dirk Bursian Ester Faia

The efficacy of monetary authority actions depends primarily on the ability of the monetary authority to affect inflation expectations, which ultimately depend on agents' trust. We propose a model embedding trust cycles, as emerging from sequential coordination games between atomistic agents and the policy maker, in a monetary model. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factor, namely the price of future risk, and their expectation formation process: these effects in turn interact with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer survey we analyze the link between trust on the one side and the transmission mechanism of shocks and of the policy rate on the other: data show that the two interact significantly and in a way comparable to the obtained in our model.

Twin picks : disentangling the determinants of risk-taking in household portfolios (2013)

Laurent E. Calvet Paolo Sodini

This paper investigates risk-taking in the liquid portfolios held by a large panel of Swedish twins. We document that the portfolio share invested in risky assets is an increasing and concave function of financial wealth, leading to different risk sensitivities across investors. Human capital, which we estimate directly from individual labor income, also drives risk-taking positively, while internal habit and expenditure commitments tend to reduce it. Our micro findings lend strong support to decreasing relative risk aversion and habit formation preferences. Furthermore, heterogeneous risk sensitivities across investors help reconcile individual preferences with representative-agent models.

Endogenous banks' networks, cascades and systemic risk (2013)

Marcel Bluhm Ester Faia Jan Pieter Krahnen

We develop a dynamic network model whose links are governed by banks' optmizing decisions and by an endogenous tâtonnement market adjustment. Banks in our model can default and engage in firesales: risk is transmitted through direct and cascading counterparty defaults as well as through indirect pecuniary externalities triggered by firesales. We use the model to assess the evolution of the network configuration under various prudential policy regimes, to measure banks' contribution to systemic risk (through Shapley values) in response to shocks and to analyze the effects of systemic risk charges. We complement the analysis by introducing the possibility of central bank liquidity provision.

How does contagion affect general equilibrium asset prices? (2013)

Nicole Branger Holger Kraft Christoph Meinerding

This paper analyzes the equilibrium pricing implications of contagion risk in a Lucas-tree economy with recursive preferences and jumps. We introduce a new economic channel allowing for the possibility that endowment shocks simultaneously trigger a regime shift to a bad economic state. We document that these contagious jumps have far-reaching asset pricing implications. The risk premium for such shocks is superadditive, i.e. it is 2.5\% larger than the sum of the risk premia for pure endowment shocks and regime switches. Moreover, contagion risk reduces the risk-free rate by around 0.5\%. We also derive semiclosed-form solutions for the wealth-consumption ratio and the price-dividend ratios in an economy with two Lucas trees and analyze cross-sectional effects of contagion risk qualitatively. We find that heterogeneity among the assets with respect to contagion risk can increase risk premia disproportionately. In particular, big assets with a large exposure to contagious shocks carry significantly higher risk premia.

Interbank network and bank bailouts : insurance mechanism for non-insured creditors? (2013)

Tim Eisert Christian Eufinger

This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.

Basel III and CEO compensation in Banks : pay structures as a regulatory signal (2013)

Christian Eufinger Andrej Gill

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

Monetary policy and risk taking (2013)

Ignazio Angeloni Ester Faia Marco Lo Duca

We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel — monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output.

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