OPUS 4 | Universitätspublikationen

Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions (2011)

Jens Prüfer Uwe Walz

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.

Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline (2011)

Xavier Freixas Christian Laux

The aim of this paper is to examine what has been the role of information provision to the market throughout the crisis. We consider two main sources of information to the market, financial statements and information provided by credit rating agencies. We examine how these sources of information work and the effectiveness of their disclosure process during the crisis. Contrary to the commonly held view, fair value accounting did not have a major impact on the crisis development and severity. However, the structure and lack of accountability of credit rating agencies had a profound impact on their incentives, which may have jeopardized the accuracy of the whole rating process. We claim that the crisis experience has changed the way we think about information as well as market discipline and discuss policy implications and proposals for regulation. JEL Classification: G01, G24, G28, M41, M48 Keywords: Mark-to-Market, Fair-Value Accounting, Credit Rating Agencies, Financial Crisis, Regulation, Financial Institutions, Banks

The emerging new architecture of financial regulation (2011)

Charles Goodhart

On the role of the liquidity premium in the regulation of insurers (2011)

Christian Laux

Prepared by Christian Laux, Vienna University of Economics and Business & Center for Financial Studies (CFS) for the “Workshop on Liquidity Premium in Solvency II: Conceptual and Measurement Issues,” DNB Amsterdam, March 18, 2011. The insurance industry and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS) propose to add a liquidity premium to the risk-free rate when discounting liabilities in times of financial turmoil. The objective is to counterbalance adverse effects on regulatory capital due to a decrease in asset values caused by illiquidity in a crisis. As I argue in this note, although the motive might be sensible, the proposal to add a liquidity premium when discounting liabilities is not the right approach to tackle the problem.

Is rated debt arm's length? : Evidence from mergers and acquisitions (2011)

Reint Gropp Christian Hirsch Jan Pieter Krahnen

In this paper we challenge the view that corporate bonds are always arm’s length debt. We analyze the effect of bond ratings on the stock price return to acquirers in M&A transactions, which tend to have significant effects on creditor wealth. We find acquirers abnormal returns to be higher if they are unrated, controlling for a wide variety of other effects identified in the literature. Tracing the difference in returns to distinct managerial decisions, we find that, everything else constant, rated firms increase their leverage in takeover transactions by less than their unrated counterparts. Consistent with a significant role for rating agencies, we find monitoring effects to be strongest when acquirer bonds are rated at the borderline between investment grade and junk. Finally, we are able to empirically exclude a large number of alternative explanations for the empirical regularities that we uncover. JEL Classification: G21, G24, G32, G34 Keywords: Acquisitions, Credit Ratings, Mergers and Acquisitions, Arm’s Length Debt, Abnormal Returns

Long-run growth expectations and "global imbalances" (2011)

Mathias Hoffmann Michael U. Krause Thomas Laubach

This paper examines to what extent the build-up of "global imbalances" since the mid-1990s can be explained in a purely real open-economy DSGE model in which agents’ perceptions of long-run growth are based on filtering observed changes in productivity. We show that long-run growth estimates based on filtering U.S. productivity data comove strongly with long-horizon survey expectations. By simulating the model in which agents filter data on U.S. productivity growth, we closely match the U.S. current account evolution. Moreover, with household preferences that control the wealth effect on labor supply, we can generate output movements in line with the data. JEL Classification: E13, E32, D83, O40 Keywords: Open Economy DSGE Models , Trend Growth , Kalman Filter , Real-time Data , News and Business Cycles

Market response to investor sentiment (2011)

Jördis Hengelbrock Erik Theissen Christian Westheide

This paper reconsiders the effect of investor sentiment on stock prices. Using survey-based sentiment indicators from Germany and the US we confirm previous findings of predictability at intermediate time horizons. The main contribution of our paper is that we also analyze the immediate price reaction to the publication of sentiment indicators. We find that the sign of the immediate price reaction is the same as that of the predictability at intermediate time horizons. This is consistent with sentiment being related to mispricing but is inconsistent with the alternative explanation that sentiment indicators provide information about future expected returns. JEL Classification: G12, G14 Keywords: Investor Sentiment , Event Study , Return Predictability

Is BEST really better? : Internalization of orders in an open limit order book (2011)

Joachim Grammig Erik Theissen

This paper studies the market quality of an internalization system which is designed as part of an open limit order book (the Xetra system operated by Deutsche Börse AG). The internalization sys-tem (Xetra BEST) guarantees a price improvement over the inside spread in the Xetra order book. We develop a structural model of this unique dual market environment and show that, while adverse selection costs of internalized trades are significantly lower than those of regular order book trades, the realized spreads (the revenue earned by the suppliers of liquidity) is significantly larger. The cost savings of the internalizer are larger than the mandatory price improvement. This suggests that internalization can be profitable both for the customer and the internalizer. JEL Classification: G10 Keywords: Internalization , Execution Quality , Adverse Selection Costs

Strategic trading and trade reporting by corporate insiders (2011)

André Betzer Jasmin Gider Daniel Metzger Erik Theissen

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 Keywords: Insider Trading , Directors' Dealings , Corporate Governance , Market Efficiency

Short sale constraints, divergence of opinion and asset values: evidence from the laboratory (2011)

Gerlinde Fellner Erik Theissen

The overvaluation hypothesis (Miller 1977) predicts that a) stocks are overvalued in the presence of short selling restrictions and that b) the overvaluation increases in the degree of divergence of opinion. We design an experiment that allows us to test these predictions in the laboratory. The results indicate that prices are higher with short selling constraints, but the overvaluation does not increase in the degree of divergence of opinion. We further find that trading volume is lower and bid-ask spreads are higher when short sale restrictions are imposed. JEL Classification: C92, G14 Keywords: Overvaluation Hypothesis , Short Selling Constraints , Divergence of Opinion

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