25th IVR World Congress: Law, Science and Technology Frankfurt am Main 15–20 August 2011 ; Paper Series
25th IVR World Congress Law and technology Frankfurt am Main 15–20 August 2011 Paper Series
- human rights (6) (remove)
- Human rights and the law: the unbreachable gap between the ethics of justice and the efficacy of law (2012)
- This paper explores the structure of justice as the condition of ethical, inter-subjective responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the interests of the self. From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse. Rights do not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject animated by the universality of the dignity of autonomous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, rights enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.
- What is become of the rights of men? : are you the only men who have rights? ; moral contractarianism and the legitimation of universal human rights (2012)
- In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
- Human rights and justice in a multicultural world (2012)
- This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
- The justification of homeschooling vis-a-vis the european human rights system (2012)
- The very idea of the European Convention on Human Rights is to bring the laws of contracting states into line with fundamental human rights principles. Where the Convention is not explicit, the Court should never rule restrictively so as to reduce the scope of a general right. In the case of homeschooling, the Convention sets forth the general principle that “the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” It must not, therefore, allow a contracting state to eliminate a means of achieving this desired by parents—unless the state can show that the means in question is ineffective.
- John Gray and the implications of value pluralism for legal philosophy (2012)
- John Gray is the thinker who has reconstructed the main tenets of ethical pluralism inherent in the work of its initiator - Isaiah Berlin - and pointed to its consequences for political philosophy. In particular he singled out three levels of conflict in ethics identifiable in Berlin’s writings: among the ultimate values belonging to the same morality or code of conduct, among whole ways or styles of life and within goods or values which are themselves internally complex and inherently pluralistic. It is the third, internal kind of conflict that proves to be the richest in implications.Because it undermines a whole constellation of contemporary liberal doctrines informed by the Kantian-Lockean tradition that conform to the legal paradigm. From the pluralist perspective such monumental theories (e.g. those of Rawls or Dworkin) are no longer sustainable due to the recognition that no ultimate value is immune to the phenomenon of incommensurability. Thus, irresolvable conflicts may also break out within the given regulative value. Confronting ethical pluralism with general reflection on law has mostly negative consequences. Nevertheless, the incommensurability thesis sheds considerable light on certain legal disputes. This claim will be illustrated by interpreting from the pluralist perspective the controversy over the verdict by the European Tribunal of Human Rights of 3 November 2010 concerning hanging crosses in classrooms.